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Objectives: Many patients want help in considering medical information relevant to 
treatment decisions they have to make or agree to. The present research investigated whether 
focussing on particular issues relevant to a medical treatment decision (using an apparently 
non-directive procedure) could systematically bias a treatment decision. 
Design and methods: In a randomised design, participants (community volunteers, n=146) 
were given standard information about treatment of cardiac risk factors by medication 
(statins). There were four experimental interventions in which the participants focussed on 
the likely personal relevance of subsets of the information previously given (positive, 
negative or mixed aspects) or on irrelevant information. Participants were asked to rate their 
anticipated likelihood of accepting treatment before and after the experimental intervention.  
Results: The rating of acceptance of treatment was significantly increased by positive 
focussing; negative focussing did not significantly alter the decision rating.  
Conclusions: The results partially replicate similar studies in health screening decisions. 
Reasons for the differences in results from those obtained in screening studies are considered. 
It is suggested that negative focussing may have less effect in decisions in which there are 
few risks.  
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Interest in shared decision making in medical treatment has stimulated research into patient 
preferences regarding medical consultation style. Shared decision making consists of 2 main 
parts: firstly the provision of information; and secondly the process of using that information 
to make the decision. Regarding this first point, results of studies considering a wide range of 
diseases consistently indicate that patients desire high levels of information about the 
treatment options available. For example, this has been shown when considering hormone 
replacement therapy (HRT) and pain (Wroe, Salkovskis, Rees & Jack, 2013), in rehabilitation 
medicine patients (Beisecker & Beisecker 1990) and cancer patients (Beaver, Campbell, 
Craven, Jone, Luker & Susnerwala, 2009). Furthermore, research has shown the long term 
benefits of involvement in the decision process regarding satisfaction (Wroe et al, 2013). 
Particularly the extent to which patients perceived themselves as having been prepared for the 
side effects of the medication has been shown, in a range of conditions including the use of 
HRT, and treatments for pain, HIV and asthma, to be related to long term effects, including 
adherence, anxiety and satisfaction (e.g. Wroe, 2002; Wroe et al, 2013; and Wroe & Thomas, 
2003). In order to ensure that patients are given the opportunity to make informed and 
unbiased decisions, it is crucial that we understand the ways in which patients can be 
involved in the decision process, in a way that is not biased by the health professional 
involved. This study focuses on the second phase of shared decision making; that is, the way 
in which people use the information to make a medical decision. The research aims to 
improve our understanding of the ways in which “biases” might operate in the second phase 
of decision making, using the theoretical framework of the modified Subjective Expected 
Utility Theory (Wroe, Salkovskis & Rimes, 1998).  
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The modified subjective expected utility model (Wroe, Salkovskis, & Rimes, 1998) proposes 
that decision making involves a process of balancing the perceived negative and positive 
consequences of possible outcomes of each option, weighted according to the beliefs and 
values of the decision maker at that time, and including anticipated emotional consequences. 
The theory suggests that the extent to which a person is attending to particular anticipated 
consequences at the time they are making the decision is likely to be crucial. Factors of which 
the person is not currently aware are much less likely to influence the outcome. If this is so, 
then even when information is provided in a non-directive manner (free of bias), then 
subsequent procedures to support the process of decision making which have the effect of 
focussing the person’s attention on a particular outcome are likely to influence the actual 
decision taken. Often, such procedures support the patient in eliciting values of possible 
outcomes, e.g the value of the potential benefits in terms of day-to-day quality of life, or of 
the potential side effects of the medication. This process of value elicitation would, by 
definition, be considered ‘nondirective’ (i.e. absence of deception, threat or coercion 
(Kessler, 1992; Kessler, 1997), and no provision of advice). However, according to the 
modified Subjective Expected Utility Theory, even after the provision of unbiased 
information in Phase 1, this process of value elicitation in Phase 2 could systematically bias 
the decision outcome.  
Several research studies support this theory, demonstrating that the decision outcome is 
related to the balance of pros and cons on which people focus at that time (e.g. Wroe, 2002; 
Wroe & Thomas, 2003). In addition, experimental studies have demonstrated that the extent 
to which a person is attending to particular anticipated consequences at the time they are 
making the decision, influences both the hypothetical and actual medical decisions (Rimes, 
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Salkovskis, Bolton & Wroe, 2010; Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000; Wroe, Salkovskis, & Rimes, 
2000; Wroe & Salkovskis, 1999). This was the case even when they are implemented in a 
way that conforms to current definitions of the form of non-directive approaches (Kessler, 
1992, 1997).  
For example, participants were given a balanced set of information about the pros and cons of 
bone density screenings as phase 1 of the decision support. Subsequently, as phase 2, they 
were asked to reflect upon and rate the extent to which the previously given information was 
personally relevant (described as a focussing intervention). When the focus was mainly on 
negative items of the previously given information, participants were less likely to express a 
preference to undergo testing; when positive, more likely to opt for testing. The experimental 
procedures that were used were designed so that both negative and positive focussing were 
similar to non-directive reflection, and value elicitation, as used in counselling. It was 
concluded that even when information is provided in a non-directive way (free of bias), if the 
subsequent phase of assigning personal relevance to information is biased, there will still be a 
directive effect, such that focussing on positive or negative aspects in the phase of assigning 
personal relevance systematically influences the decision outcome.  
 
 
Understanding treatment preferences and medical decision making is particularly salient 
given the government’s key strategy to ensure that patients are involved in treatment 
decisions as described in the mandate ‘Liberating the NHS: No decision about me, without 
me’ (Department of Health, 2012). It is stated that, ‘All patients who wish to be involved in 
decisions and choices about their treatment and management of their condition should receive 
the relevant information and professional support to do so......possibly facilitated 
through the use of a patient decision aid to explore their treatment options’ (page 29). Patient 
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decision aids are specifically recommended for decisions about treatment for cholesterol 
(NHS Right Care, 2012) which include 5 steps: 
1. “Introduction: Overview of the decision, options and health problem 
2. Compare options: Information about all the options explained side-by-side 
3. My Views: Thinking about what matters to you about the decision 
4. My Trade-Offs: Weighing up the pros and cons of the options to you 
5. My Decision: Make a decision that is right for you at this time” 
Throughout this process, patients are to be offered ‘Decision Support’, that is the opportunity 
to ‘Speak with a Health Coach at any point throughout your decision making process’.  
 
Given this government/NHS supported strategy, it is crucial therefore to understand how 
people can be helped through each of these steps, in a way that reaches the goal of making a 
decision that is right at this time. Not only must the patient be must be fully informed, but 
he/she must also be encouraged to think ‘about matters relevant to’ him/her regarding this 
decision, and to weigh ‘up the pros and cons’. It is the second part of the decision making that 
is the focus on this paper. The authors seek to address the question as to how the Health 
Coach can support the decision in a way that is systematic and unbiased. The modified 
Subjective Expected Utility Theory would suggest that the Health Coach’s role to support 
patients in ‘Thinking about what matters to you about the decision’ and ‘Weighing up the 
pros and cons of the options to you,’ could systematically bias the patient’s decision outcome 
even if performed in a way that was previously considered ‘nondirective’. 
  
The studies of Wroe and colleagues were carried out in the context of screening decisions. 
The aim of the present study is to address the issue of whether the focussing effects found in 
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screening generalise to decisions about whether or not to accept a particular treatment. As in 
the screening studies, there are ethical considerations which constrain experimental studies in 
this area of research. A hypothetical treatment decision (whether to take cholesterol-lowering 
medication or not) was therefore the focus of the present investigation. It is hypothesised that, 
consistent with the modified Subjective Expected Utility Theory, even after unbiased 
provision of information (phase 1), the issues on which individuals are subsequently 
encouraged to focus through value elicitation (Phase 2) systematically biases the decision 
outcome.  
 
Method 
Overview 
Participants were asked to consider a hypothetical situation in which they were identified as 
being at risk of heart disease so that treatment with statins would be likely to be helpful. The 
study then examined how this likelihood was influenced by an experimental manipulation 
which took the form of an apparently non-directive procedure. Participants were randomly 
allocated to one of four conditions in which they were induced to focus on: the potentially 
positive or negative aspects of the treatment decision, a combination, or irrelevant health 
information. Full ethical approval was given by the local NHS Local Research Ethics 
Committee. 
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from adults passing by a busy pharmacy shop in Oxford city 
centre. Of the people approached one in six agreed to take part in a 10-15 minute interview 
about health psychology. Those who scored either 100 or 0 on the initial rating of the first 
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question (the anticipated likelihood that they would consider taking statins) were not included 
in the final sample in order to deal with ceiling and floor effects; in other words, participants 
who scored 0 or 100 at baseline can, by definition, only change in one direction. This resulted 
in the exclusion of 25 people scoring 0 and 18 scoring 100, a total of 43 people of whom 22 
were male and 21 female. This excluded group did not differ (p>0.1) from the total sample in 
terms of gender or age. The final sample reported here was therefore 146 people. Participants 
who reported a history of heart problems or high cholesterol were excluded. One participant 
withdrew from the study as s/he felt unable to concentrate on the questions. The original 
intention was to have the three experimental groups with 40 participants, with the control 
group having 20. Selection on the basis of extreme scores on the initial question resulted in 
slightly uneven cell sizes. There were no significant differences between groups in terms of 
the baseline measures (see Table 1) (p> 0.15 in every instance), and the groups did not differ 
in terms of gender distribution (p>0.2).  
Procedure 
Participants read an information sheet and signed a consent form, and were then asked to 
imagine a hypothetical situation in which they were identified as being at risk of heart disease 
by their general practitioner. All participants were given identical information about the 
prevalence of heart disease, and the benefits and disadvantages of taking medication (statins).  
At this stage the participants were asked to give ratings of likelihood of opting for testing (on 
0-100 scales): (i) the anticipated likelihood that they would consider taking this drug (statins); 
(ii) the anticipated likelihood that they would take this drug if the doctor recommended it. 
Until this stage, the experimenter was unaware of the participant's allocation to experimental 
condition as randomisation had been pre-arranged for the entire batch of questionnaires. 
 
 8 
Thus, the experimental condition was only known to the experimenter once they turned to the 
focussing questions page. Participants were thus randomly allocated on the basis of the 
questionnaire sequence to one of the four experimental groups.  
 
Intervention 
The focussing groups were: positive focussing; negative focussing; mixed focussing; and 
control. Each of the groups was then asked to respond to a series of questions on different 
aspects of the information that was given at the outset - the focussing manipulation questions. 
Those in the positive group were encouraged to focus on the previously described possible 
benefits of taking statins. This was done by asking them to rate the degree to which each 
statement would apply to them. Participants in this group were asked to rate the applicability 
of the following positive focussing statements:  
-If I had decided to take the statins drug I would be very relieved that my chances of 
having a heart attack were reduced 
-If I had decided to take the statins drug I would feel that at least I had some control 
over health 
-If I had decided to take the statins drug I would be pleased that my high cholesterol 
levels were being reduced 
-If I had decided to take the statins drug I would be pleased that I would be having 
regular check-ups 
-If I had decided to take the statins drug I would feel better that I was taking action 
towards being a healthier person 
-If I had decided to take the statins drug taking the drug each day would remind and 
motivate me to find out and do all I could to prevent a heart attack  
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-If I had decided to take the statins drug it would comfort me to know that I might 
be able to prevent myself having a heart attack 
-If I decided not to take statins if I then suffered a heart attack I would regret the 
decision not to take statins 
-If I decided not to take statins I would worry that my cholesterol levels would 
remain high or become even higher 
-How much do you think that it would put your mind at rest knowing that you were 
doing everything you could to prevent yourself from suffering a heart attack?   
 
Participants in the negative group were encouraged to focus on the previously described 
negative aspects of taking statins by rating the extent to which they felt the following 
negative statements would apply to them.  
-If I had decided not to take the statins drug I would be glad that I wasn’t relying on 
drugs everyday 
-If I had decided not to take the statins drug I would be glad not to have to worry 
about side effects of this drug  
-If I had decided to take the statins drug I would worry the drug hasn’t been 
sufficiently tested to know what long term effects it might have 
-If I had decided to take the statins drug I would be upset about having to take a 
drug for the rest of my life 
-If I had decided to take the statins drug, it would be frustrating to take a drug every 
day especially when I didn’t actually feel ill 
-If I had decided to take the statins drug it would be troublesome to have to go to my 
doctor for regular check ups 
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-If I had decided to take the statins drug if after a long time statins didn’t have any 
significant effect on my cholesterol levels I would regret taking them 
-If I had decided to take the statins drug I would be constantly looking out for side 
effects of the drug 
-If I had decided to take the statins drug if I were to suffer long term side effects I 
would regret having taken the statins drug 
-Finally overall, how much do you think that the side-effects and your concerns 
about them would worsen your quality of life? 
 
Those in the mixed group were asked to rate the applicability of a balanced subgroup of 
positive and negative statements. The participants in the control group were asked to rate the 
extent to which they believed that statements about the common cold applied to them. 
Following this focussing procedure, participants were asked to summarise briefly the issues 
which had been discussed and rated. The decision ratings were then repeated. 
 
Treatment of data 
Post-manipulation data were analysed using separate repeated measures analyses of 
covariance, with the baseline (pre-manipulation) point used as covariate. Significant main 
effects were examined using Tukey-b multiple comparisons.
 Results 
Overview 
The results indicate a significant and differential effect of the positive focussing manipulation 
on the rated likelihood of opting for taking statins. Participants in this positive focussing 
group said that they were more likely to opt for the treatment after the manipulation than 
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other groups. There was no apparent effect of the negative (or other) conditions. 
 
Treatment decision ratings 
An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) for ratings of how likely the person would be to 
consider taking statins indicated that the experimental condition effect was significant (F[3, 
141]=17.3, p<0.0001). Multiple comparisons indicate that the rated likelihood that they 
would consider taking statins was significantly higher in the positive focussing group 
compared with all other groups (effect size for the post intervention ratings = 0.78). The other 
groups did not differ from each other. In particular there were no significant differences 
between the negative focusing group and other groups (effect sizes for the post intervention 
ratings = 0.24). These results are shown in Table 1 and Figure 1.  
-------------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 ------------------------------------- 
 Figure 1 about here 
 ------------------------------------- 
There was also a significant main effect of condition in the ANCOVA for the rating of how 
likely they would be to take the drug if the doctor recommended it (F[3, 141]=4.6, p<0.005). 
Multiple comparisons indicated that the positive condition ratings were significantly higher 
than those in the negative focussing group, and that the remaining comparisons were not 
significantly different (see Table 1). The effect sizes for the post intervention ratings 
compared to the control group were 0.43 for the positive group and 0.31 for the negative 
group.  
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As sampling had resulted in slightly (non-significantly) unbalanced gender composition 
between experimental groups, all analyses were repeated with gender included as a second 
grouping factor. There was no evidence of any effect of gender (F<1.5 for all effects and 
measures).  
 
Discussion 
The experimental study reported here examined the effect of attending to different aspects of 
treatment options on a hypothetical treatment decision. The initial information provided to 
each participant (phase 1 of shared decision making) was identical across groups to ensure 
that the only difference was the way in which this information was subsequently reflected 
upon (Phase 2 of shared decision making). The results of this study demonstrated that 
focussing on positive aspects of treatment outcome was significantly associated with an 
increase in the rated likelihood of opting for treatment (i.e. taking the medication) compared 
to the other groups. The effect sizes for the post intervention ratings suggested a medium to 
large effect of the positive focusing intervention on ‘likelihood of opting for treatment’ and a 
small to medium effect on ‘likelihood of opting for treatment if the doctor recommended it’. 
At a power level of 0.8, this suggests that estimated sample sizes of 12 and 35 respectively 
would be required to obtain significant results using α of 0.5. In comparison, there were no 
significant differences between the negative focusing group and other groups. The effect 
sizes for the post intervention rating suggest small effects of the negative focusing on 
‘likelihood of opting for treatment’ and on ‘likelihood of opting for treatment if the doctor 
recommended it’. At a power level of 0.8, estimated sample sizes of 109 and 66 respectively 
would be required to obtain significant results using α of 0.5. It is concluded that there is a 
weak negative effect of the negative focussing on the decision.  
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The findings in terms of the decision ratings are partly consistent with previous studies 
involving decisions made about undergoing screening tests. In those studies, individuals who 
were encouraged to focus on the positive consequences of a going for a screening test were 
significantly more likely to opt for screening (Rimes et al, 2010; Wroe et al., 2000). Note 
that, in those studies and in the study reported here, the information provided in phase 1 was 
identical across conditions and the focussing manipulation in phase 2 was confined to the 
information given at that earlier stage. These previous studies found that negative focussing 
significantly reduced the rating of likelihood of opting for screening, with this effect also 
being reflected in actual screening uptake. There was no sign of such an effect in the present 
study. 
 
There are several factors which may account for the difference between the present study and 
the previous ones. The most obvious of these is that the decision involved here was whether 
or not to accept treatment rather than to undergo screening, as in the previous studies. It may 
be that this accounts for the difference; for example, it might be that people react completely 
differently to the contemplation of treatment, or that treatment is simply seen as “a good 
thing” and therefore would be accepted if offered by a physician and that negative 
considerations would not affect the acceptance of treatment. However, it is difficult to see 
how this would not also be the case in health screening procedures. 
 
Comments made by the participants during the debriefing carried out on completion of the 
study suggest another explanation. Statins are a particularly benign form of treatment, with 
relatively few and rare negative effects. The items in the positive focussing condition 
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included benefits such as e.g. “I would be very relieved that my chances of having a heart 
attack were reduced” and, “If I didn’t take statins and then suffered a heart attack I would 
regret the decision not to take statins”, whilst negative focussing items were relatively weakly 
valenced eg. “I would be upset about having to take a drug for the rest of my life” and, “It 
would be frustrating to take a drug especially when I didn’t actually feel ill”. It may have 
been that the choice of statins therefore provided a built in imbalance. The research group are 
completing a further study designed to evaluate the impact of focussing on a treatment 
decision for which there are more and more severely negative consequences. Subsequent 
studies will also examine whether the effect observed on an anticipated decision will 
generalise to the actual decision to accept treatment in the same way as was observed in 
screening (Wroe et al, 2000).  
 
We chose to sample “in the street” as we had previously found that the samples of 
convenience obtained in this way gave a good mix of gender, age, educational status and 
socioeconomic background. We believe that the mix obtained is more representative of the 
target population (people who might be involved in making decisions about their health) than 
the use of students. Historically, recruiting outside a pharmacist's shop had allowed the 
researcher to use the physical context by linking it to the notion of health-related decisions. It 
is, however, possible that our sampling method (approaching potential participants in a busy 
street) may have resulted in a biased sample, given that one in six of those approached 
participated. This sample was selected because true representative sampling is difficult, time 
consuming and costly, and it is assumed that if the selection criteria do not depart too far 
from the population of interest (examples of departures might include exclusive use of 
students or health care professionals) then at worst sampling effects would mask the true 
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effect size. Consistent with this view, we have subsequently been able to replicate and extend 
the present findings in a sample of patients in a GPs waiting room, with close to 80% of those 
invited to participate agreeing to do so (MacInnes, Wroe & Salkovskis, in preparation). A 
further potential limitation is that the researcher was not blind to the participants’ conditions 
and this may have inadvertently influenced the researcher’s manner. 
 
The findings have important implications for the way in which patients are helped to make 
treatment decisions. As in screening decisions, it may no longer be sufficient to rely on the 
idea that one has been “non-directive” (as defined by the form of the consultation) in order to 
respect the need for patient autonomy in decision making. The findings are consistent with 
research by Michie, French, Allanson, Bobrow, & Marteau, 1997), who suggested that it can 
be difficult to achieve non-directiveness within a decision-oriented consultation, which 
involves reflecting the patient’s behaviour, thoughts or emotions. Furthermore, historically it 
was suggested that nondirective therapeutic approaches are unlikely to be achievable (Truax, 
1966); this work noted that therapeutic aspects such as ‘quoting’ what the patient may have 
said and empathy can be reinforcers, and therefore be directive. He concluded that there are 
‘significant differential reinforcement effects imbedded in the transactions of client-centred 
psychotherapy’ (pp. 7). It may, however, be possible to take advantage of the impact of 
focussing to implement behaviour change when this is more or less unequivocally positive 
(see for example Burgess, Bish, Hunter, Salkovskis, Michell, Whelehan &. Ramirez, 2008). 
 
It is important to consider whether the experimental interventions used in the present study 
could be regarded as having similarities with the kind of clinical procedures likely to be used 
by clinicians applying principles of non-directive counselling. This is difficult, as such 
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procedures are poorly defined; when they are defined, it is usually only in terms of what they 
do not contain (e.g. advice and opinion).  
Phase 2 of shared decision making can often be regarded as non-directive because it helps the 
person to explore the available options and their likely emotional and other consequences 
without offering advice, guidance or opinion. The current research suggests that this phase of 
value elicitation, or of assigning personal relevance to information, which may be offered not 
only by counsellors, but also by doctors or by computerised decision aids, may systematically 
bias the decision outcome.  
 
It seems more than likely that clinical versions of the procedures we used in this experimental 
study are currently used in clinical decision making consultations, with the degree of 
emphasis varying considerably. Note, however, that it is possible that those with a formal 
training in non-directive counselling may seek to preserve the balance between positive and 
negative in a specific way. Whether or not this is true is not known at this point, as it has not 
been investigated. 
 
Recently, Williams, Alderson and Farsides (2002) suggested that “neutrality in the unequal 
relationship of doctor-patient communication is simply not possible”. This paper is 
interesting for its qualitative examination of clinicians’ views. Obstetrician 71 on page 344 
indicates that he thinks there is little point in encouraging people to think about the negative 
issues as they are not going to be relevant for a majority of the people. Obstetrician 36 also 
mentions the difficulty of deciding what to 'put into the discussion' as not everything will be 
helpful and it may cause anxiety. He/she states that the difficulty is where you draw the line. 
Similar ideas are currently being discussed with complex decisions such as MMR 
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immunisation. It has been suggested by some that discussing adverse effects will simply raise 
anxiety and should be minimised. Although this position is understandable, in recent work we 
have found the opposite to be true (Wroe, Turner, & Owens, 2005). Williams also highlights 
that these issues are becoming more 'complex as the Human Genome Project develops' and 
that counsellors may actually becoming more directive 'behind the smokescreen of the 
rhetoric of value-neutrality and non-directiveness'. 
 
If the results are considered from a different perspective (such as public health rather than 
counselling), it might be that the findings could be taken indicating the availability of a set of 
strategies which might be useful in instances where treatment acceptance and adherence is a 
major issue and the desirable treatment decision outcome is unambiguous. However, the 
ethics of using such strategies need close examination, particularly as the previous work on 
actual uptake of screening indicated that (i) the participants did not accept that their decision 
had been influenced when debriefed and (ii) the intensive debriefing and attempts by the 
researchers to undo the effects had no discernible impact on the participant’s behaviour. 
 
The findings of this study that participants’ hypothetical treatment decisions were 
systematically influenced by the ‘nondirective’ approach, is concerning given the emphasis 
on shared decision making. Strategies are needed which protect patients from the potentially 
biasing effects of this second phase of shared decision making. It is crucial that a decision aid 
approach is developed and used by health coaches, counsellors, doctors etc. so that patients 
achieve unbiased decision support. The current study demonstrates that when individuals 
were encouraged to focus on both the negative and the positive information, there was no 
significant change in decision outcome. It is possible therefore that, until a more systematic 
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means of offering truly non-directive counselling is developed, the best approximation to 
nondirective decisional support is that of a balance between the focus on positive and 
negative issues. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the experimental groups and pre-and post-interventions ratings 
 
 
 
 
negative group 
(N=36) 
 
positive group 
(N=45) 
 
all-focussing 
group (N=41) 
 
control 
group (N=24) 
 
Repeated 
measures 
ANOVA 
 
Age 
Mean [SD] 
47.61 [10.75] 
Mean [SD] 
49.73  [10.54] 
Mean [SD] 
45.54 [9.57] 
Mean [SD] 
46.83 [9.40] 
 
n/a 
Gender 
 
 
19 women  
17 men 
 
Pre mean [SD] 
Post mean[SD] 
28 women  
19 men 
 
Pre mean [SD) 
Post mean[SD] 
23 women 
18 men 
 
Pre mean [SD] 
Post mean[SD] 
8 women 
15 men 
 
Pre mean[SD] 
Post mean[SD] 
n/a 
Likelihood they 
would consider 
taking statins 
50.14 [23.769] 
50.55 [22.77] 
 
49.56  [24.38] 
74.00  [23.66] 
51.34  [24.80] 
57.07  [25.27] 
52.92  [19.61] 
56.04  [22.69] 
F[3, 141]=17.3 
p<0.0001 
Likelihood would 
take statins if Dr 
recommended it 
 
62.78  [27.58] 
61.25 [24.42] 
73.11  [25.70] 
80.77  [24.84] 
66.83  [25.81] 
67.80  [26.57] 
69.58 [28.62] 
69.38 [28.06] 
F[3,141]=4.6
p<0.005 
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Figure caption 
 
 
Figure 1: Ratings of likelihood of taking statins by group and time point.  
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